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High-Frequency Trading and the New Stock Market: 
Sense And Nonsense
*This is a condensed version of The New Stock Market: Sense and Nonsense, 65 
DUKE LAW JOURNAL 191 (2015).
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tock trading in the U.S. has been totally trans-
formed over the last twenty-five years. The 
NASDAQ dealers and NYSE specialists are gone; 
the same stock can now be traded on up to 60 
competing venues where computers match incoming orders. 
But not everyone is pleased with the results. 
The new stock market features several controversial partici-
pants and practices. High-frequency traders (“HFTs”), which 
participate in a significant portion of all trades, are criticized 
as taking advantage of other traders by rapidly adjusting their 
own orders in response to transactions in a practice known 
as “electronic front-running.” Also under suspicion are “dark 
pools,” which are off-exchange trading venues that promise to 
keep orders secret and can limit trading to certain kinds of 
traders.1 And perhaps most visibly, HFTs have been blamed 
for events like the infamous “Flash Crash” of May 6, 2010, a 
period of less than 30 minutes during which the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average dropped about 1,000 points (representing 
9% of its value) and then recovered almost its entire loss. Polls 
indicate that “roughly two-thirds of Americans believe the stock 
market unfairly benefits some at the expense of others,” a belief 
that some commentators use to explain a sharp drop in the 
percentage of Americans directly or indirectly owning equities.2 
Critics have been vocal. Charlie Munger, vice chairman 
of Berkshire Hathaway, argued that high-frequency trading 
is “legalized front-running . . . [that] should never have been 
able to reach the size that it did.”3 And New York Attor-
ney General Eric Schneiderman has complained that “[w]
hen blinding speed is coupled with early access to data, it 
gives small groups of traders the power to manipulate market 
movements in their own favor before anyone else knows 
what’s happening.”4 But the most critical and well-publicized 
attack on the new stock market appeared in Michael Lewis’ 
best-selling book, Flash Boys: A Wall Street Revolt. Lewis 
famously claimed that “[t]he United States stock market, the 
most iconic market in global capitalism, is rigged.”5 
Regulators reacted rapidly to the furor over the new 
stock market ignited by Lewis’ book. Soon after, the U.S. 
Department of Justice, the FBI, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”), and the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission all confirmed investigations into HFTs. The 
New York Attorney General brought a high-profile lawsuit 
against the major investment bank Barclays, alleging that 
it misrepresented the extent to which its dark pool was free 
of HFT activity.6 And several Congressional hearings were 
held, after which U.S. Senator Carl Levin wrote to Mary Jo 
White, the Chair of the SEC, demanding significant changes 
to market structure and the elimination of “[c]onflicts of 
interest [that] erode public confidence in the markets.”7
In this condensed summary of our earlier work, we argue 
that the issues are more complicated. And because the perfor-
mance of the U.S. equity market has important effects on not 
only the investment returns of ordinary individuals, but the 
overall efficiency and real rate of growth of the U.S. economy, 
much is at stake in how such issues get resolved and what 
policy interventions are targeted at them.
We will argue that effective resolution of these contro-
versies must begin with a comprehensive framework for 
understanding the new stock market. While legal schol-
ars have applied the insights of many economic theories to 
law, they have largely not done so with the field of market 
microstructure. This article uses the insights of microstruc-
ture economics to provide a framework that relies on two 
basic mechanisms—adverse selection and the principal-agent 
problem—to analyze these controversial trading practices 
as they operate within a multi-venue system. We apply this 
framework to five of the new market’s most controversial 
practices and evaluate the effects in terms of the ultimate 
social functions served by the equity markets. 
We conclude that some proposed reforms appear 
unambiguously desirable, such as those requiring brokers 
to improve their disclosures regarding their execution of 
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customer orders, including those directed to dark pools. But 
other proposed reforms involve tradeoffs between different 
social goals, where the most socially desirable outcome is 
far from clear. In such cases, a better understanding of the 
tradeoffs involved should make for more informed regula-
tory choices, while also pointing to where further empirical 
research would be useful. We find this to be the case with 
proposals, for example, to briefly delay providing HFTs with 
information about new transactions and quotation changes, 
and so reduce HFTs’ informational advantages over other 
traders. Finally, still other proposed reforms are bad ideas that 
seem to be based on a misunderstanding of how the market 
really works or of the actual impact of a given practice. We 
find this to be the case for proposals that would require HFTs 
to keep their quotes in force for some minimum amount of 
time, as well as for proposals aimed at generally discouraging, 
or even banning, trading on dark pools.
How the Stock Market Has Changed
As recently as the early 1990s, publicly traded stocks were still 
largely confined to trading on a single venue, which was either 
NASDAQ or the New York Stock Exchange. For anyone 
wanting to buy or sell a stock listed on NASDAQ, a member 
dealer was the purchaser of every share sold and the seller of 
every share bought. Dealers provided prices based on their 
own calculations and judgments as individual human beings. 
At the NYSE, stock “specialists” played a similar dealer role, 
but also posted quotes sent in by traders willing to buy or sell 
at stated prices, held auctions, and helped arrange trades by 
brokers and traders on the NYSE floor. 
Today, the NASDAQ dealers and NYSE specialists are 
gone. Any given stock can be traded on one of almost 60 
competing venues, twelve exchanges, and around 30 active 
dark pools.8 Most of these competing trading venues, and 
all of the exchanges, are electronic limit order books, where a 
trader can post as a limit order its firm commitment to buy 
or sell up to a specified number of shares at a quoted price. A 
computer (the venue’s matching engine) matches these posted 
limit orders with incoming buy and sell market orders, which 
are orders from traders willing to trade at whatever is the best 
available price in the market.9 
Today, HFTs post a significant portion of the limit orders 
that result in executed trades.10 An HFT uses high-speed 
communications and data about activity at venues to constantly 
update its information about executed trades in each stock that 
it regularly trades, as well as changes in the buy and sell limit 
orders posted by others on every trading venue. Computers 
use this information and proprietary algorithms to change the 
HFT’s own limit orders posted on each of the various trading 
venues. More than three-quarters of all trades in the United 
States are executed on one or another of these venues.11 Most 
of the remaining trades involve a broker that internally matches 
the buy and sell orders received from its own retail customers 
or through over-the-counter market-making. 
Forces for Change and the Role of Regulation
The new stock market is partly the product of the infor-
mation technology revolution, but also partly the result of 
Congressional and SEC choices. The initial impetus for this 
new market structure was Congress’s adoption in 1975 of the 
National Market System (“NMS”) amendments to the Secu-
rities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”). 
Multiple, competing trading venues have the advantage 
of greater efficiency and stronger incentives for innovation. 
At the same, they have the disadvantage that orders are 
fragmented among multiple venues, complicating the match-
ing of buyers and sellers. Improving information technology 
allows traders to manage this complexity by showing what is 
going on in each of these venues. 
Congress’ NMS amendments pushed the system to 
develop in this direction, and this development has been 
consistently supported by the SEC.12 And the dramatically 
increased speed and lower cost of trading that have been 
documented since then suggest that the new stock market is 
a substantial improvement over what came before it.13 Though 
academic theorists continue to debate whether even greater 
improvements would have arisen if today’s technology were 
operating within a centralized single venue system, this is 
entirely a matter of speculation. Moreover, as a matter of 
political reality, any attempt to centralize the multiple venues 
would meet stiff resistance from those who have configured 
their businesses for a multi-venue structure. Thus, we believe 
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14. See supra Subsections I.A and I.C for a discussion of exchange matching engines 
and HFT co-location facilities.
15. This example fleshes out the story by Michael Lewis of how electronic front run-
ning could occur with Amgen stock in such a situation. Lewis, Flash Boys, at 33-34. 
Lewis asserts that the HFT could profit at the expense of others by cancelling its quotes 
on another exchange, but he does not discuss exactly why it would be profitable for the 
HFT to do so. Nor does he analyze how the quotes initially available might be different if 
the practice of electronic front running were eliminated. The discussion that follows fills 
in these holes. 
managed institutional investor, Smartmoney, decides that 
Amgen’s future cash flows are going to be greater than its 
current price suggests. The NBO is $48.00, with 10,000 
shares being offered at this price on BATS Y and 35,000 
shares at this price on NYSE. Smartmoney decides to buy a 
substantial block of Amgen stock and sends a 10,000 share 
market buy order to BATS Y and a 35,000 share market 
buy order to NYSE.15 The 35,000 shares offered at $48.00 
on NYSE are all from sell limit orders posted by Lightning. 
The order sent to BATS Y arrives at its destination first 
and executes. Lightning’s co-location facility there learns 
of the transaction very quickly. An algorithm infers from 
this information that an informed trader might be looking 
to buy a large number of Amgen shares and thus may have 
sent buy orders to other exchanges as well. Because of Light-
ning’s ultra-high speed connection, it has the ability to send a 
message from its BATS Y co-location facility to its co-location 
facility at NYSE, which in turn has the ability to cancel 
Lightning’s 35,000 share $48.00 limit sell order posted on 
NYSE. All this can happen so fast that the cancellation would 
occur before the arrival there of Smartmoney’s market buy 
order. If Lightning does cancel in this fashion, it has engaged 
in “electronic front running.” 
Critics of the practice assert that this allows HFTs to 
benefit at the expense of institutional investors.
2. HFT slow market arbitrage. Suppose that the HFT 
Lightning has a limit sell order for 1,000 shares of IBM at 
$161.15 posted on NYSE. This quote represents the NBO at 
the moment. Institutional investor Mr. Lowprice then posts 
a new 1,000 share sell limit order for IBM on EDGE for 
$161.13. The national reporting system is a bit slow, and so 
a short period of time elapses before it reports Lowprice’s 
new, better offer. Lightning’s co-location facility at EDGE 
very quickly learns of the new $161.13 offer, however, and 
an algorithm sends an ultra-fast message to Lightning’s 
co-location facility at NYSE informing it of the new offer. 
During the reporting gap, though, Lightning keeps posted 
its $161.15 offer. Next, Ms. Stumble sends a marketable buy 
order to NYSE for 1,000 IBM shares. Lightning’s $161.15 
offer remains the official NBO, and so Stumble’s order could 
legally transact against it. Lightning’s co-location facility at 
NYSE then sends an ultra-fast message to the one at EDGE 
instructing it to submit a 1,000 share marketable buy order 
there. This buy order transacts against Lowprice’s $161.13 
offer. Thus, within the short period before the new $161.13 
offer is publicly reported, Lightning has been able to sell 
1,000 IBM shares at $161.15 and purchase them at $161.13, 
for what appears to be a riskless $20 profit.
the policy favoring multiple venues is unlikely to be reversed 
in the future, and any reforms enacted will take place within 
the current multiple venue system. 
The NMS amendments also included broad provisions for 
consolidating information in the U.S. stock market. The SEC 
requires trading venues to have systems (called SIPs); there 
is one for NASDAQ listed stock and one for securities listed 
either on the NYSE or elsewhere, which provide the best bid 
and best offer quotes for each stock traded. The SIPs aggregate 
this information into consolidated books with the best offer 
and best bid for a stock at each of the venues where it trades, 
along with the corresponding sizes, and they make this quote 
information available to the public on fair and reasonable 
terms. At any given time, the best bid and best offer on this 
consolidated book represents the official National Best Bid 
(NBB) and National Best Offer (NBO), which together make 
up the NBBO.
But because the national reporting system’s updates lag 
slightly behind any change in the best bid or offer avail-
able, HFTs can use their co-location, private data feeds, 
and superior information technology infrastructure to carry 
out their practices of electronic front running, slow market 
arbitrage, and dark pool mid-point order exploitation. During 
the lags, they can cancel standing limit orders and post new 
ones—which means that the quotes in the consolidated book 
may no longer in fact be available.
Five of the Most Controversial New Practices
In the rest of this article, we focus mainly on five new stock 
market practices that have attracted particular controversy. The 
first three practices are made possible by the HFTs’ “co-loca-
tion” of computers right next to each exchange’s matching 
engine, which allows the HFTs to learn about trades and 
adjust their limit bids and offers sooner than some other trad-
ers. (It must be stressed, though, that many traders other than 
HFTs also co-locate, acquire high-speed communications, and 
use private data feeds.) HFTs can cancel old limit orders and 
submit new ones very quickly. The HFT’s co-location facil-
ity at each exchange is connected to all its other co-location 
facilities through specialized fiber optic cables that have their 
matching engines in northern New Jersey. 
1. HFT electronic front running. Let’s examine the practice 
of electronic front running through a simple example involv-
ing just one HFT, called Lightning, and two exchanges, 
BATS Y and the NYSE. Lightning has co-location facilities 
at the locations of the BATS Y and NYSE matching engines. 
These co-location facilities are connected with each other 
by high-speed communications equipment.14 An actively 
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“liquidity suppliers” or “market makers.” A professional 
supplier of liquidity—in this case, let’s assume it’s an HFT—
buys and sells shares frequently, and it makes money if on 
average it sells the shares it buys for more than the price 
it paid. As discussed below, a major problem HFTs face is 
adverse selection: the possibility that another trader has private 
information about a stock’s value that is not known to most 
of the market or to the liquidity supplier. When dealing with 
such traders, liquidity suppliers will on average lose money 
because the better informed will sell to the HFT only when 
it is willing to pay too much and buy from the HFT only 
when it is willing to sell for too little. To survive, liquid-
ity suppliers must set bids and offers aggressively enough to 
attract business, but not so aggressively that they lose more 
money trading with informed traders than they make from 
uninformed traders. To minimize their losses from adverse 
selection, liquidity providers try to identify orders that are 
coming from informed traders. At the same time, informed 
traders try to prevent their orders from being so identified in 
order to buy or sell shares at the best possible prices.
Principal-agent problems. Most traders, even institutional 
ones, need brokers, and brokers often exercise substantial 
discretion when handling customer orders. Principal-agent 
problems arise from conflicts of interest between the broker 
(the agent) and the investor (the principal) because the inves-
tor usually cannot perfectly observe the broker’s effort and 
skill. 
Multiple venues. Finally, it’s important to recognize that 
although managing adverse selection and principal-agent 
problems were challenging under the old single-venue market 
system, such challenges have been greatly increased by the 
existence of many competing venues for stock trading, which 
have made possible all of the controversial practices listed 
above.
In sum, the adverse-selection-driven cat and mouse game 
between liquidity suppliers and informed traders occurs 
within multiple trading venues and in the context of rapid 
information technology advances that have created extraor-
dinary complexity as well as new scope for principal-agency 
problems between brokers and traders. By understanding how 
these three factors interact in a competitive environment, you 
can understand most of what is happening.
The Economics of Liquidity Provision
It might appear that a professional liquidity supplier such as 
an HFT could make money easily, even in markets with a one 
cent spread. For example, simply buying at the bid and selling 
at the offer to make a half cent per share on every transaction 
for a billion shares should yield a tidy—and apparently risk-
less—profit of $50 million. In fact, it is not so easy.
Liquidity suppliers generally do not know whom they 
are trading with. There is always the possibility that the 
trader who places a marketable order that executes against 
3. HFT exploitation of mid-point orders sitting in dark 
pools. On yet another day, suppose that an institutional trader 
posts a mid-point limit buy order in a dark pool that, until 
cancelled, would execute against any market sell order that 
subsequently arrived at the dark pool and at a price equal to 
the mid-point between the best offer and best bid reported 
by the national reporting system on any of the exchanges. 
Through its speedy co-location facilities, the HFT Lightning 
would observe that the new best offer on that exchange is 
lower than the mid-point between what, until that moment, 
had been the best bid and best offer available on any public 
exchange. Because of the national reporting system’s brief 
lag, Lightning could buy shares at the new better price and 
then immediately send a sell order to the dark pool, which 
executes against the trader’s order at the mid-point between 
the still official, but now stale, best offer and best bid reported 
by the national system. Since the price paid for the shares by 
Lightning on the exchange is lower than the price at which 
they are sold to the trader in the dark pool, Lightning makes 
another guaranteed profit at the expense of the other traders 
in the market.
4. Concerted selling by HFTs during market downturns, 
leading to increased volatility and crashes. There was an upsurge 
in the volatility of share prices and a few brief crashes and 
breakdowns in trading as the new stock market was emerg-
ing. Such volatility and crashes have been attributed to the 
sudden exit of HFTs from the market after receiving new 
market information. 
5. Large investment banks in their role as brokers steer-
ing orders to their own dark pools. A large investment bank 
steers an institutional customer’s buy limit order to its own 
dark pool in a way that is unobservable by other traders. The 
bank’s proprietary traders learn through an internal source of 
the institution’s buy order, giving them the option to fill the 
institution’s limit order even when that would be disadvanta-
geous for the customer.
Undertaking a Serious Analysis
Most of the criticism of the new stock market simply shows 
that in retrospect a given transaction benefited one party at 
the expense of another, finds an advantage that favors the 
former, and labels the resulting transfer as “larcenous,” “pred-
atory,” or simply “unfair.” Serious analysis requires digging 
deeper, especially since these practices occur repeatedly 
between competing actors who generally understand what 
is happening and take into account the reaction of the other 
market participants. We offer an informal equilibrium anal-
ysis of these practices.
While each of the controversial practices seems fairly 
distinct, they can all be understood by reference to two basic 
dynamics at work in today’s market structure:
Adverse selection. Limit orders substantially increase 
liquidity. Those who provide the orders are referred to as 
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16. See Lawrence E. Harris, Trading and Exchanges 158 (2002), which summarizes 
a body of theory and evidence suggesting that in most markets adverse selection ac-
counts for the majority of the bid-ask spread.
17. See Lawrence R. Glosten and Paul R. Milgrom, “Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices 
in a Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders,” 14 J. Fin. Econ. 1, 
(1985).
18. See Lawrence R. Glosten and Lawrence E. Harris, “Estimating the Components 
of the Bid-Ask Spread,” 21 J. Fin. Econ. 123 (1988), which estimates a model in which 
the bid-ask spread is divided into an adverse selection component and a transitory com-
ponent due to inventory costs, clearing costs, and other factors. .
sometimes referred to as the “information perspective,” 
focuses on how liquidity suppliers update their estimates of 
a stock’s value in anticipation of whether the next order to 
transact against its quotes is a buy or a sell. Because a liquid-
ity supplier knows that the next marketable order may come 
from an informed trader, that order will alter the liquidity 
supplier’s estimate of the stock’s value—and the adjustment 
will be up if it is a buy order and down if it is a sell order.17 
Moreover, as liquidity suppliers constantly update their 
valuations in response to the inflow of buy and sell orders, 
the market comes to reflect private information. If the news 
possessed by the informed traders is on balance favorable, 
there will be more buys than sells, and the bid and offer 
quotes will trend upward. But if the news known by the 
informed traders is bad, the mid-point between the bid and 
ask will trend downward.18
The Evaluative Framework
HFTs and investment banks trade in a competitive market on 
a repeated basis, and the other actors in the system generally 
take this fact into account in their own actions. The question 
for policymakers and regulators, then, is how their practices 
affect the multiple social goals that equity trading markets 
are expected to serve. 
The most important social goals of secondary equity 
markets are generally thought of as including: (1) promot-
ing the efficient allocation of capital so that it goes to the 
most promising new investment projects in our economy; (2) 
promoting the efficient operation of the economy’s existing 
productive capacity; (3) promoting the efficient allocation of 
resources between current and future periods; (4) allocating 
capital and risk among risk-averse investors in ways consistent 
with their capabilities and resources; (5) fostering an overall 
sense of fairness among market participants; and accomplish-
ing all these objectives while (6) economizing on the real 
resources used in trading markets, including enforcement 
and compliance costs, and (7) encouraging valuable innova-
tion in the system.
Two central characteristics of a stock market affect its 
ability to deliver on these social goals and serve as proxies 
for their success in so doing—namely, share price accuracy 
and liquidity. 
1. Price accuracy. An accurate share price does a reason-
ably good job of predicting the issuer’s future cash flows. 
Because the price of any new share offering will be deter-
mined largely by the price of its already outstanding shares, 
more accurate stock market prices will encourage capital 
the liquidity supplier’s quote is doing so because the trader 
has nonpublic information regarding the value of the stock 
that is not known to the liquidity supplier.16 Despite this 
informational disadvantage, the liquidity supplier can still 
make money on a net basis if it makes enough profit from the 
remaining traders who do not possess private information. 
We identify three primary kinds of private information, 
which we label “inside information,” “announcement infor-
mation,” and “fundamental value information.”
1. Inside information. Inside information originates 
from some institutional source, such as the company issuing 
the stock itself. The institution usually seeks to prevent this 
information from becoming public, however, and trading 
on such information is, under many circumstances, illegal 
under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act. 
Successful prosecutions under these provisions show that such 
information is behind at least some of the trading that occurs.
2. Announcement information. This is information that 
is disclosed publicly, such as a government statistic about the 
economy or a company earnings announcement. Traders who 
act on such information very quickly, before other traders 
and liquidity suppliers themselves can react and adjust 
their quotes, can earn trading profits. We refer to these as 
announcement informed traders.
3. Fundamental value information. Some investors use 
fundamental value information to produce more accurate 
estimates of an issuer’s future cash flows based on sophis-
ticated analysis of publicly available information. Traders 
with this kind of information include hedge funds, actively 
managed mutual and pension funds, non-profit institutions, 
and very wealthy individuals with actively managed portfo-
lios. Liquidity suppliers can also be vulnerable to fundamental 
valuation traders because they specialize in supplying liquid-
ity but do not do fundamental analysis themselves. 
Adverse Selection
Liquidity providers, as already noted, lose money when trad-
ing with informed sellers or buyers. But the liquidity provider 
can still break even if the bid and offer spread is large enough 
that losses from informed traders are offset by the profits from 
trading with uninformed investors.
There are two ways to think about the calculations that 
liquidity providers need to survive in a competitive market. 
The first, sometimes referred to as the “accounting perspec-
tive,” subtracts a liquidity supplier’s losses from transacting 
with the informed traders from its gains from transacting 
with uninformed traders to determine the spread. The second, 
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19. In an efficient market, the market price, whether it is relatively accurate or inac-
curate, is an unbiased predictor of an issuer’s future cash flows. If it is inaccurate, it is 
just more likely to be far off, one way or the other, from how things ultimately turn out. 
Thus an efficient, but relatively inaccurate, price would result in as many positive sur-
prises as negative ones. To many investors, the negative surprise is likely to be more 
memorable. So when a negative surprise materializes, it generates a sense of grievance 
even though, ex ante, a positive surprise was equally likely. 
20. The cost of capital is lower because the prospect of a smaller bid/ask spread re-
sults in the same issuer’s expected future cash flow being discounted to present value at 
a lower discount rate. See Yakov Amihud and Haim Mendelson, “Asset Pricing and the 
Bid-Ask Spread,” 17 Journal of Financial Economics (1986).
Analyzing the Five Most Controversial New Stock 
Market Practices
Electronic Front Running
So-called “electronic front running” involves an HFT learn-
ing of a transaction that has occurred at one exchange and 
adjusting its quotes at other trading venues. The most obvious 
reason for doing this is that the HFT has inferred that orders 
similar to the one that executed may still be in transit heading 
towards other exchanges; and the HFT, for reasons that will 
be discussed, may want to avoid transacting with those orders. 
All of the criticisms of HFT electronic front running 
focus on the fact that the HFT can be expected to be better 
off and some other trader involved worse off. It should be 
noted at the outset, however, that the HFT practice labeled 
as “electronic front running” is distinctly different from the 
kind of behavior that has traditionally been termed “front 
running.” Traditional front running, which is clearly illegal, 
refers to the practice of a broker—who bears a legal duty to its 
clients not to use their orders to its own advantage—trading 
ahead of said orders to realize a gain. In contrast, when an 
HFT engages in “electronic front running,” it has no preex-
isting relationship with the trader akin to what a broker is 
obligated vis-a-vis its customer. And the practice thus involves 
no breach of duty or mutually agreed upon terms between 
contracting parties, nor does it involve any breach by HFTs 
of the federal anti-fraud laws. (A better term for the practice 
might be “inter-venue order cancellation,” but we will stick 
with the popular term here.)
Our analysis of electronic front-running is somewhat 
involved, so a few summary points are in order. Basically, 
permitting electronic front-running enables liquidity provid-
ers to more easily adjust their quotes at trading venues in 
response to information about quotes and transactions that 
they receive at any given venue. Essentially, such adjust-
ments make it more difficult for traders who want to transact 
rapidly in large size before liquidity providers can do exactly 
that—adjust their quotes. Investors who wish to purchase or 
sell only a small volume of stock will be indifferent to order 
cancellation since they can simply transact at the top of the 
book at one venue. Also largely unaffected by the adjustments 
of liquidity providers are those investors who wish to trans-
act in significant volume, but have a considerable period of 
time to do so, and so can simply send in small orders over an 
extended period of time.
Thus, the distributional and efficiency consequences of 
electronic front-running turn on precisely who is interested in 
transacting rapidly in large size and with whom they so trans-
to flow to the issuers with the most promising investment 
projects. Share prices also influence the availability of new 
project funding from other outside sources and the willing-
ness of managers to use internal funds for investment, creating 
another link between share price accuracy and the efficient 
allocation of capital. And, finally, more accurate share prices 
also tend to create a greater sense of fairness among investors 
to the extent that they experience fewer very large negative 
surprises.19 
2. Liquidity. Liquidity is a multi-dimensional concept 
that relates to the size of a trade, the price at which it is 
accomplished, and the time it takes to complete the trade. 
Generally, the larger the size of the purchase or sale and the 
faster one wishes to accomplish it, the less desirable will be 
the price. But the more liquid the market, the less severe are 
these tradeoffs.
For a small retail purchase or sale of stock, the spread 
between the national best offer (NBO) and the national 
best bid (NBB) is a good measure of liquidity because the 
trader can buy or sell immediately at those prices and, in 
essence, will be paying half the spread to do so. For larger 
orders, the quantity of stock that is available at prices that 
are not too far above the NBO or too far below the NBB 
(both indicators of the “depth of the book”) will become 
relevant as well. 
Liquidity also has an impact on a number of social goals:
a.  More efficient allocation of resources over time. The 
more liquid an issuer’s shares, all other things equal, 
the more valuable they are.  In this sense, greater 
liquidity can be seen as reducing the issuer’s cost of 
capital, thereby encouraging it to take on more invest-
ment.20 
b.  Greater share price accuracy. To the extent more 
liquidity also lowers the transaction costs associated 
with trading based on fundamental, value-based 
investment strategies—that is, acquiring and analyz-
ing publicly available information to make more 
accurate predictions of an issuer’s cash flows and 
earnings—an increase in liquidity can also lead to 
more accurate share prices.
c.  More efficient allocation of risk. Constant change 
means that the optimal portfolio, in terms of diver-
sification and of each investor’s relative degree of risk 
aversion, is always shifting. Greater liquidity increases 
individual investors’ ability to make cost-effective 
adjustments of their portfolios over time. 
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will be better off cancelling its $48.00 limit offer on NYSE. 
As this example suggests, the fundamental distributional 
effect of permitting electronic front-running is thus to enable 
liquidity providers to reduce their losses to informed traders 
who are attempting to trade rapidly in large size. 
Further, the ability of liquidity providers to reduce losses 
to the informed has two significant consequences:
1. Electronic front running narrows spreads. The avail-
ability of electronic front running by HFTs allows HFTs 
to better detect the possibility that informed market orders 
are headed for their limit orders. If HFTs did not have the 
ability to learn these things and alter their standing limit 
orders accordingly, they would know that a larger percent-
age of the trades that will execute against their limit orders 
will come from informed traders. And the primary cost of 
being a liquidity supplier—the losses incurred from dealing 
with informed traders—would therefore go up. Accordingly, 
HFTs would widen their initially posted bid/ask spreads to 
compensate.
2. Electronic front running helps uninformed investors 
and hurts informed investors. If electronic front running were 
eliminated, uninformed traders and informed traders would 
both suffer from the resulting larger spreads—the higher 
offers and lower bids—because it will be more expensive 
for both to trade. For uninformed traders, that is the end 
of the story. Informed traders, however, would get a more-
than-compensating benefit. To see why, note that because 
eliminating electronic front running would make it more 
difficult for liquidity providers to detect informed traders, 
HFTs would increase their spreads sufficiently to cover the 
expected trading losses against informed traders, but not 
so much as to undermine their competitive position.21 And 
because the increased spreads will be borne by all traders, 
informed and uninformed alike, the higher spreads paid 
by the uninformed traders will effectively “subsidize” the 
informed traders who would otherwise have incurred even 
larger spreads.22 And this means that informed traders come 
out ahead; the gains they would have enjoyed without the 
increase in spreads are not fully dissipated by the extra they 
must pay because the spreads in fact are increased. The rest 
of what HFTs need to break even comes from uninformed 
traders, who must pay the increased spread too.
In sum, electronic front running benefits uninformed 
investors and harms informed ones who seek to trade rapidly 
in large size.
B. The ultimate incidence of electronic front running. 
Electronic front running has been regularly attacked as 
harming “ordinary investors.”23 Our analysis, however, 
act. Because trade data is anonymous, our analysis must rely 
on a stylized characterization of market participants based on 
the available empirical data and the implications of trading 
needs.
A. Wealth transfer considerations. To see the distributive 
effects of electronic front running, we will begin by assuming 
that there are only three kinds of market participants: HFTs, 
informed traders who trade on the basis of fundamental value 
information, and uninformed traders.
Why might Lightning wish to cancel its sell limit order on 
NYSE? One possibility is that given its inference that a large 
market buy order is likely soon to arrive at NYSE, Lightning 
wishes to submit, in place of its cancelled order, a new sell 
limit order for the same number of shares at a higher price—
say, $48.02. If Lightning does so and Smartmoney’s buy order 
executes against this new higher quote, the HFT will be better 
off, and Smartmoney worse off, by $.02 per share. 
Note, though, that the HFT will be able to improve its 
position in this way only if there is room in the NYSE limit 
order book so that the $48.02 offer price is still more attrac-
tive to potential buyers than any other offers with respect to 
what Amgen already posted on NYSE.  Suppose, for example, 
that prior to Lightning’s cancellation, the next best offer on 
the NYSE was 15,000 shares at $48.01 and the best offer after 
that was 20,000 shares at $48.02. The price and time prior-
ity rules would mean that Smartmoney’s buy order would 
execute against these other two standing offers, not against 
any new $42.02 offer by Lightning. 
This cautionary note, though, hides a more critical point: 
Lightning may wish to cancel its $48.00 sell limit order 
even if in fact there is no room in the book to improve its 
position by selling to Smartmoney at a higher price. Recall 
that to survive in a competitive market, a market maker like 
Lightning must set its quotes aggressively enough to attract 
business, but not so aggressively that the profit it makes when 
buying from, and selling to, uninformed traders is less than 
what it loses by engaging in such transactions with informed 
traders. $48.00 was what Lightning calculated at the time 
it posted its sell limit order to be the optimal price for an 
offer of 35,000 shares, based on what it knew then about the 
likelihood of the existence of positive private information. 
Now, however, Lightning knows something more: a large buy 
order has transacted on BATS Y. This will cause Lightning 
to revise upward its assessment of the likelihood that private 
information suggests that the value of a security is higher than 
the market previously thought. The upward revision is very 
possibly large enough that $48.00 is no longer the optimal 
price at which to offer to sell shares. In that case, Lightning 
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ing electronic front running would reduce the productive 
resources currently devoted to it, including highly sophis-
ticated technical personnel, advanced computers, and fiber 
optic networks. 26 
•	 Allocation of resources over time and allocation of 
risk. By widening spreads, elimination of electronic front 
running would make the equities market less liquid. This 
has an unambiguously negative effect, both on share prices 
and capital allocation, and on the efficient allocation of risk 
throughout the economy.
D. Taking other kinds of informed traders into account. 
As mentioned, in addition to fundamental value informa-
tion, two other types of private information can give a trader 
a significant advantage: announcement information and 
inside information. These additional kinds of private infor-
mation do not change the conclusions above that electronic 
front running has positive effects on uninformed investors or 
that electronic front running consumes real resources. But, 
taking account of these additional kinds of private informa-
tion may well change the conclusion above about the impact 
of electronic front running on fundamental value information 
traders and hence the impact on price accuracy.
One might conclude that eliminating electronic front 
running would help traders with announcement information 
and inside information more than traders with fundamental 
value information. If HFTs need to increase spreads suffi-
ciently to cover their increased trading losses, fundamental 
value information traders would have to pay as much extra per 
trade as traders on the other two kinds of private information, 
but would get only a small portion of the additional trading 
gains. It is thus quite possible that fundamental value infor-
mation traders will gain less than they pay in increased spread 
and thus will be hurt by the elimination of the practice. 
This is because fundamental value traders are less suscep-
tible to detection by electronic front runners than the other 
two kinds of private information traders. Announcement 
information traders need to do all of their trading quickly 
and therefore need to do larger transactions, which are easier 
for HFTs to detect and react to. Fundamental value traders, 
by contrast, often spread their planned purchases or sales over 
several days or weeks, and so break the total amount they 
wish to transact into small packets that look more like the 
trades of uninformed traders. Admittedly, we would need to 
know much more to make this characterization definitively, 
but the longer the time period before other market partici-
pants get wind of the information possessed by an informed 
trader, the less that trader’s incentive to trade in substantial 
suggests that this is mistaken. Retail investors generally lack 
any significant private information and are assumed to be 
uninformed. Small uninformed investors are helped, not 
hurt, by electronic front running.
Most of the persons whose money is invested in index-
based mutual funds and pension funds would also presumably 
count as ordinary investors. These entities too, by definition, 
are uninformed traders. The purchases and sales of such funds 
are not prompted by any kind of private information; they 
simply buy all the stocks in the index when they receive a net 
inflow of investor funds and sell all stocks in the index when 
the volume of investor redemptions is sufficient to result in 
a net outflow of funds. Again, electronic front running, by 
narrowing spreads and reducing the cost of trading, generally 
helps, not hurts, these funds and their ordinary investors. 
However, insofar as index funds sometimes find themselves 
needing to trade rapidly in large size, they too will suffer from 
the availability of electronic front-running.
Critics have pointed out that the beneficiaries of electronic 
front running are the exchanges and the HFTs themselves24—
and here they are closer to the mark. An exchange charges 
HFTs fees for permitting co-location: namely, the right to 
place the HFT’s server very near the exchange’s matching 
engine. If electronic front running were eliminated tomorrow, 
HFT co-location facilities would be worth less to the HFTs 
and this may reduce the rents collected by the exchanges. Any 
such reduction in rents certainly would hurt the exchanges, at 
least in the short run.25  In the much longer run, the revenues 
of firms in a competitive industry can be expected to just 
equal their costs, including an ordinary market return on 
capital. Thus, any revenues lost from co-location fees would 
need to be made up through higher charges to investors who 
trade on the exchange.
C. Efficiency considerations. Recall that the fundamental 
effect of electronic front-running is to make it harder to trade 
rapidly in large size without liquidity providers adjusting their 
quotes. Assessing the efficiency consequences of this means 
understanding how the relevant participants are affected. 
Elimination of electronic front running would have three 
effects in terms of the efficient operation of the economy, two 
of which would appear to be efficiency-increasing and one 
efficiency-reducing. 
•	 Improved share price accuracy. Elimination of 
electronic front running would make it more profitable for 
informed traders to generate new private information and so 
they will do more of it, thereby making prices more accurate.
•	 Reduced resources going to HFT activities. Eliminat-
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point between the best publicly reported bid and offer at the 
time of execution. Mid-point orders appear to have the advan-
tage of enabling uninformed investors to buy at well below 
the best offer and to sell well above the best bid.
 It has been noted for a number of years, however, that the 
traders who post such orders are vulnerable to the activities 
of HFTs.27 Mid-point order exploitation again involves an 
HFT detecting an improvement in the best available bid or 
offer on one of the exchanges before the new quote is publicly 
reported. The HFT puts in an order to transact against the 
new improved quote, and then sends an order reversing the 
transaction to a dark pool that contains mid-point limit 
orders with the opposite interest that transact at a price equal 
to the mid-point between the now stale best publicly reported 
bid and offer. (For an illustrative example of such mid point-
order exploitation, see Section 2 of the APPENDIX.)
A. Wealth transfer and efficiency considerations. HFT 
exploitation of dark pool mid-point orders clearly provides 
rents to HFTs. There is no social benefit from this activity 
since it is unrelated to the main positive function that we have 
attributed to HFTs—namely, providing liquidity in a world 
with both uninformed and informed traders. Since trading 
is a zero-sum game, if the HFTs gain, certain regular traders 
must lose.
The economic function of dark pools is to provide a place 
for uninformed traders to lower their costs by trading with 
other uninformed traders. By undermining the ability of such 
traders to do this, mid-point exploitation by HFTs hurts not 
only those who use dark pools but also those who would 
have used them but for this higher cost. This will reduce the 
efficiency of both the allocation of resources over time and 
the allocation of risk in the economy.
Nevertheless, to the extent that the practice steers more 
uninformed traders to the exchanges, it leads to a narrowing 
of spreads on the exchanges, thereby reducing the cost of 
fundamental value information trading and thus improving 
share price accuracy. 
High-Frequency Trading and Volatility
When making his case that HFT activity causes greater 
volatility in equity markets, Michael Lewis asserts that the 
intra-day price volatility of the stock market was 40% greater 
between 2010 and 2013 than it was between 2004 and 2006, 
and associates this change with the enactment of Reg. NMS 
and the rise of HFTs.28 But there is a major problem with this 
comparison: the years 2004-2006 were ones of uncharacteris-
tically low volatility, below that of any other two-year period 
from 1998 to 2012.29 And the years 2010-2013 are also unrep-
resentative in the sense that they came in the wake of the most 
volume quickly. An announcement trader must trade quickly, 
since the signal that makes them informed has just become 
public. Not so with the fundamental value informed trader. 
In fact, further research may well suggest that electronic 
front running actually helps, not hurts, fundamental value 
information trading. And to the extent this is so, we would 
have to modify our earlier conclusion that electronic front 
running would reduce share price accuracy. 
Slow Market Arbitrage
Slow market arbitrage can occur when an HFT has posted a 
quote representing the NBO or NBB on one exchange, and 
subsequently someone else posts an even better quote on a 
second exchange, which the HFT learns of before it is reported 
by the national system. If, in the short time before the national 
report updates, a marketable order arrives at the first exchange, 
the order will transact against the HFT’s now stale quote. The 
HFT, using its speed, can then make a riskless profit by turn-
ing around and transacting against the better quote on the 
second exchange. (For an illustrative example of slow-market 
arbitrage, see Section 1 of the APPENDIX.)
A. Wealth transfer effects. In contrast to electronic front 
running, which decreases the effective cost of trading for 
uninformed traders but increases it for informed traders, slow 
market arbitrage increases the effective cost of trading for all 
regular traders, informed and uninformed.
B. Efficiency considerations. Although arbitrage usually 
has positive economic welfare effects, slow market arbitrage 
has little in common with ordinary arbitrage. Slow market 
arbitrage adds a third party, the liquidity supplier, whose only 
social purpose is to facilitate trades between regular traders, but 
who are the only gainers from the so-called arbitrage. Regular 
traders, both informed and uninformed, are losers because their 
cost of trading goes up. So the normal presumption in favor 
of activities carrying the label “arbitrage” does not apply here.
Even if slow market arbitrage consumed no real resources, 
it would have an unambiguously negative impact on welfare. 
By raising the effective cost of trading for informed traders, 
slow market arbitrage makes it less rewarding for funda-
mental investors to seek out publicly available information 
and analyze their implications in a sophisticated way. This 
reduces share price accuracy, with all the negative effects 
already described. 
HFT Exploitation of Mid-Point Orders
A trader will often submit to a dark pool a “mid-point” 
limit buy or sell order, the terms of which require that it be 
executed against the next marketable order with the opposite 
interest to arrive at the pool and at a price equal to the mid-
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in response to the large sell orders. This temporary disappear-
ance of the HFTs removed substantial liquidity.35
The crucial question is: Why would a large market sell 
order trigger a flight by HFTs, when the business of HFTs is 
to provide liquidity to persons submitting marketable orders? 
The short answer is that, as we have seen, adverse selection 
shapes the provision of liquidity.36 The Flash Crash is directly 
connected to adverse selection. A large, aggressive sell (or buy) 
order suggests to liquidity providers that the order submitters 
may have important private information. If that is correct, 
then HFTs will lose money from trading that order and so 
they will widen their spreads. If the adverse selection threat 
becomes extreme enough, many or all liquidity providers will 
temporarily exit from the market altogether and prices will 
fluctuate widely.37 This happened on a large scale during the 
Flash Crash. 
In sum, the behavior of HFTs during the Flash Crash was 
not predatory; it was simply self-preserving and unheroic.38 
Moreover, the history of human market makers’ responses to 
crises is largely consistent with this episode.
B. Wealth transfer considerations. The wealth transfers 
resulting from gyrations such as the Flash Crash are the same 
as those that occur at other times when HFTs stop provid-
ing liquidity. The losers are the traders who put in market 
sell orders for stocks that temporarily went way down and 
market buy orders for stocks that temporarily went way up. 
The winners were those who posted previously way-out-of-
the-money limit orders against which these market orders 
transacted. 
C. Efficiency considerations. Events such as the Flash 
Crash receive a lot of public attention, but such occasional 
brief moments of total collapse of liquidity are not ultimately 
very important in terms of the performance and efficiency of 
the overall economy—though, if large and frequent enough, 
they could have important effects on investors’ confidence in 
the market. But barring that possibility, such sharp but very 
brief deviations of share prices from fundamental values do 
not seriously undermine capital allocation; it is accuracy most 
severe financial crisis since the Great Depression and thus 
significantly increased uncertainty about the fundamental 
values of securities.30 A more useful and revealing comparison 
would have shown that market volatility during the period 
2012 to the present, even with the expanded HFT activity, 
was considerably lower than the volatility experienced during 
the comparably long (and more representative) period of the 
1990s and early 2000s. 
In sum, there is little serious evidence of a causal link 
between HFTs and ongoing increased volatility: HFTs, as 
just noted, rose to prominence during a period of greater 
volatility that was attributable to economic causes that had 
little to do with the HFTs themselves. And there is also no 
theoretical reason for expecting HFT activity to increase 
general, ongoing volatility. Indeed, the majority of academic 
evidence on the subject suggests that the activity of HFTs 
reduces such volatility.31
A. The Flash Crash. More interesting and plausible is the 
claim that HFTs exacerbate volatility during market disrup-
tions, such as the infamous May 6, 2010 “Flash Crash.” The 
Flash Crash occurred during a period of less than 30 minutes 
in which the Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped about 
1,000 points (representing 9% of its value) and then recovered 
almost its entire loss. This was the DJIA’s greatest one-hour 
decline in history and several individual stocks displayed 
astonishing volatility. 32 Accenture, for instance, fell from 
$39.98 at 2:46 p.m. to one cent at 2:49 p.m., only to return 
to $39.51 by 2:50 p.m. 
The Flash Crash was widely taken to “highlight the risks 
of electronic trading,” as suggested in a report by NYSE’s then 
head of operations.33 And in the years since, other commen-
tators have also blamed HFTs for the severity of market 
crashes.34 However, the report eventually issued by federal 
regulators explained the Flash Crash not as the result of HFT 
predation, but as the result of a liquidity crisis caused by a 
series of large sell orders that triggered a flight of liquidity 
from the market. This flight involved HFTs, but only in the 
sense that many HFTs are market makers who left the market 
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advantages given to HFTs, and that Barclays, as a broker, claimed that it treated all 
venues the same based on quality, while it actually disproportionately routed client or-
ders to its own pool. See Complaint, Schneiderman v. Barclays, No. 451391/2014 
(N.Y. Sup. 2014), at ¶¶ 1-2.
43. See, e.g., In the Matter of Pipeline Trading Systems LLC, SEC Release No. 33-
9271; In the Matter of Liquidnet Inc., SEC Release No. 33-9596.
44. See Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading System Rule 301(b)(5), 17 
C.F.R. § 242.301(b)(5) (1997); Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, Securities 
Exchange Act Release No. 34-61358, 17 C.F.R. § 242, at 72 (“As [trading systems] that 
are exempt from exchange registration, [off-exchange platforms] are not required to pro-
vide fair access [to all traders] unless they reach a 5% trading volume threshold in a 
stock, which none currently do[es]” and that “[a]s a result, access to . . . [these plat-
forms] . . . is determined primarily by private negotiation.”).
45. See, e.g., Rhodi Preece, Dark Pools, Internalization, and Equity Market Quality, 
CFA Institute Codes, Standards, and Position Papers 12-13 (2012).
46. The operator provides a similar service to the extent that it keeps out HFTs that 
engage in mid-point order exploitation.
47. A broker can make money off transactions occurring on its dark pool for several 
additional reasons. If it is executing marketable orders on its dark pool, then a broker will 
receive its commission without having to subtract the “taker” fee charged marketable 
orders on most exchanges. If the broker is internalizing orders on its own dark pool and 
transacting against them as principal, then it can make half the spread on each trade. 
And then there are the more nefarious inducements suggested by the criticisms, such as 
exploitation of orders by a broker’s HFT affiliate that has improperly been given details 
about orders.
48. This requires the broker to exercise “reasonable diligence to ascertain the best 
market” for a transaction to ensure an order receives a price “as favorable as possible 
under prevailing market conditions.” In essence, the duty of best execution is a default 
term in the contract between the broker and its customer. Its violation leads to the same 
efficiency concerns that any other breach would: the fact that the parties voluntarily en-
tered into the transaction no longer leads to the presumption that it can be expected to 
The ideal dark pool would be one where the parties 
posting limit mid-point orders and sending in marketable 
orders are completely uninformed. The system begins to break 
down when dark pool traders are informed. Since informed 
traders will transact against limit orders in the dark pool only 
when the mid-point price looks advantageous to them, such 
trades are likely to be disadvantageous to the person posting 
the limit offer. Thus, the dark pool operator provides a service 
if it can effectively monitor the parties posting the mid-point 
limit orders and the parties sending in marketable orders to 
ensure that both sides are relatively unlikely to be informed.46
B.  Wealth transfer and efficiency considerations. An 
order sent to a less than ideal dark pool may execute at less 
desirable terms than at another venue. If an investment bank 
sends a trader’s order to its own dark pool knowing that the 
order would receive superior execution elsewhere, the bank 
gains and the customer loses.47 The same result is likely if the 
bank ignores customer instructions or if it misrepresents the 
nature of the parties allowed to trade on the bank’s dark pool 
to create the impression that there is less danger of informed 
counterparties than there really is. All of these effects make 
investment banks richer and traders poorer. What’s more, 
brokers have a legal duty of best execution in routing their 
customers’ orders, one that should be enforced as vigorously, 
but also as cost effectively, as possible.48 Moreover, such 
practices are inefficient for the simple reason that fraud, 
misrepresentation, and failure to carry out customer orders 
as directed all end up undermining the voluntary nature of 
transactions, and thus the underlying premise that trade is 
mutually beneficial and so welfare enhancing.
Recommendations
Potential regulatory responses to these five practices can be 
seen as falling into three groups: (1) proposals designed to 
limit the negative effects of front-running and other practices 
associated with HFTs’ speed and informational advantages; 
of the time that matters. The modern stock market’s overall 
performance in terms of liquidity provision and operational 
costs is far better than the market of the past.
Dark Pools and the Fate of Customer Orders
Large investment banks, which are both important brokers 
and operators of dark pools,39 have been accused of direct-
ing their brokerage orders to their own dark pools even when 
the orders will receive inferior execution there.40 Dark pool 
operators are also alleged to misrepresent the nature of other 
parties’ trading in their pools in order to induce brokerage 
customers to use the pools. Customers have difficulty detect-
ing such practices; and even when they do, they are allegedly 
reluctant to switch brokers because they depend on “soft 
money” services from the banks.41
We do not know whether any of these practices is 
widespread,42 though it’s worth noting that the SEC has 
brought a number of successful proceedings against dark pool 
operators.43 These practices are clearly illegal, and their wealth 
transfer and efficiency effects appear completely negative. If 
evidence emerges that they are in fact widespread, we would 
suggest policy reforms designed to make enforcement of the 
current laws more effective.  
A. Understanding the function of dark pools. A dark 
pool, like an exchange, is typically an electronic limit order 
book; but unlike an exchange, it does not publicly reveal the 
limit orders that are posted on it. Dark pool operators restrict 
who can post limit orders and submit marketable orders.44 
Despite their nefarious-sounding moniker, dark pools can 
provide useful, legitimate services to their customers. Such 
pools were initially created with the aim of limiting adverse 
selection costs by providing a venue where uninformed buyers 
and sellers could trade substantial amounts of stock at prices 
potentially much better than the NBO and NBB.45 The 
mid-point is a substantially better price for the buyer than 
the NBO, and it is the same for the seller relative to the NBB. 
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advance the interests of both and that it is thus efficiency enhancing. This duty exists 
both as a matter of state common law of agency and under the rules of the Financial 
Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”). 
49. It should be noted that a significant portion of retail marketable orders and index-
based institutional orders execute off exchanges and in venues where the trades can be 
identified as largely uninformed.  See SEC Release No. 34-68937; File No. SR-NAS-
DAQ-2012-129, February 15, PG. 17 (2013; Rhodi Preece, Dark Pools, Internaliza-
tion, and Equity Market Quality, CFA Institute Codes, Standards, and Position Papers 3 
(2012) (“Internalization is also thought to account for almost 100% of all retail market-
able order flow.”). In a fully competitive market, the spreads associated with these trades 
should not include a significant adverse selection component. Thus, they should be unaf-
fected by whether or not electronic front running occurs on the exchanges, where, in the 
absence of the practice, the spreads would be wider to reflect the greater risk that the 
HFTs are subjected to in dealing with informed traders. In reality, however, the spreads 
are barely smaller in these off exchange executions (i.e., there is only a small amount of 
“price improvement”). As analyzed below, why this is the case will affect the conclusion 
of whether wider spreads on the exchange in fact are passed on to the retail customer. 
50. See Jones, supra note 31, at 42-51.
practices as unfair. Under normal circumstances, the best 
response to misunderstanding is education, not prohibition 
of an activity that does not in fact pose a problem. Still, an 
unfounded but persistent sense of unfairness is demoralizing: 
it simply makes people feel bad to think that a major social 
institution is corrupt. It also discourages direct and indirect 
ownership of equities by persons who, without this sense that 
something unfair was going on, would find equities to be a 
suitable investment vehicle. More empirical study of market 
confidence could make a valuable important contribution to 
more effective securities policymaking. If the perception of 
information asymmetries prevents a substantial amount of 
retail participation in equities, regulation designed to maintain 
or increase such confidence may indeed be worthwhile. 
2. What happens to the case for eliminating electronic 
front running when slow market arbitrage and exploitation of 
dark pool mid-point orders are added to the analysis? These 
two practices both seem unquestionably undesirable. Slow 
market arbitrage hurts all regular traders, uninformed and 
informed alike, by increasing their effective cost of trading. Its 
economic welfare effects are unambiguously negative as well. 
The exploitation of dark pool mid-point orders by HFTs hurts 
uninformed investors and misallocates resources and risk. 
And even if it may be good social policy to push uninformed 
traders out of dark pools and onto exchanges, there are more 
direct ways of doing it than allowing HFTs to profit in this 
particular fashion. 
3. What does this imply about current proposals to 
regulate HFTs? When evaluating measures to prevent 
electronic front running and other speed-based practices, 
we lean toward reforms that would reduce HFTs’ informa-
tional advantages, provided it can be done at relatively low 
cost and would reduce or eliminate slow market arbitrage 
and mid-point order exploitation while not interfering with 
electronic front-running.
Consider two regulatory proposals that aim to curb 
high frequency quoting activity.50 The first provides finan-
cial disincentives for high-volume quoting, such as NYSE 
Euronext’s recent surcharge on each order above a 100:1 
order-to-trade ratio. If mandated by regulation, such fees 
would widen spreads and reduce depth by making it harder 
for market makers to control adverse selection and inventory 
risks through their quoting strategies.
A second proposal would impose a minimum time-in-
force for quotes, prohibiting them from being canceled, 
within, for example, 100 milliseconds of submission. But 
(2) proposals intended to limit the effects of HFTs on stock 
market volatility; and (3) proposals intended to limit abuses 
by dark pools. 
Proposals to Regulate HFT Speed in  
Obtaining Market Information
Such proposals are designed to limit any negative effects of 
three of the controversial practices we have focused on: elec-
tronic front running, slow market arbitrage, and exploitation 
of dark pool mid-point orders. 
1. Would it be desirable to eliminate electronic front 
running? The unfairness case against electronic front running 
is weak. And it is unclear whether the informational advan-
tages that HFTs obtain from electronic front running call for 
regulatory intervention on efficiency grounds. Based on what 
we know at the moment, the matter may be too close to call. 
a. Actual unfairness. Electronic front running actually 
appears to benefit ordinary retail investors, including those 
who own mutual fund investments or pension funds that 
invest in indices and trade on exchanges. Retail investors 
are largely uninformed, and index investing is by definition 
uninformed.49 The elimination of electronic front running 
would likely reduce liquidity for such investors, making 
uninformed trading more expensive without any gains for 
the uninformed traders from the increased anonymity.
b. Efficiency. Elimination of electronic front running 
could arguably produce efficiency gains from better capital 
allocation arising from increases in price accuracy. But such 
gains, as just noted, would come at the expense of reduced 
liquidity, leading to less efficient capital and risk allocation. 
And on balance, it is not clear that elimination would increase 
efficiency. Our more nuanced analysis, which considers the 
roles in price discovery played by announcement information 
traders, suggests that eliminating electronic front running 
would reduce, not improve, price accuracy. In terms of its 
effects on various kinds of informed traders, electronic front-
running makes it more difficult for announcement traders 
to be profitable, but does not affect the profitability of 
fundamental value trading. Because announcement trading 
harms liquidity but is of little benefit from a price accuracy 
perspective—since real economy decision making obviously 
occurs on a much longer time scale than mere milliseconds—
electronic front-running probably improves price accuracy.
c. Appearance of unfairness. While our analysis suggests 
that electronic front running does not actually result in 
unfairness, a substantial portion of the public still views HFT 
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51. For example, Budish et al.’s proposal, which was endorsed by New York’s Attor-
ney General Eric Schneiderman. See Eric B. Budish, Peter Cramton, & John J. Shim, The 
High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Re-
sponse, Fama-Miller Working Paper; Chicago Booth Research Paper No. 14-03 (Decem-
ber 23, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2388265.
52. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.603(a)(2). Section 11A(c)(1) of the Exchange Act autho-
rizes the Commission to regulate market data. 
53. See Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,567 & 37,569 (June 29, 2005) 
(adopting release), http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-51808fr.pdf.
54. In a 2012 proceeding, the SEC found that NYSE had been sending market data, 
including best bids and offers, to private subscribers before it sent that data to the SIP, 
and fined NYSE $5 million. See In the Matter of New York Stock Exchange LLC, and 
NYSE Euronext, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 67857, 2012 WL 4044880 
(2012), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2012/34-67857.pdf.
this interpretation as well. 54 Nonetheless, the language of 
603(a) is plausibly open to requiring that best quote and 
transaction data arrive at the same time for all traders. Such 
a regulation, if effectively enforced, would have the effect 
of limiting, though not completely eliminating, the infor-
mational advantage of HFTs. And by so doing, some of the 
liquidity benefits of electronic front running for uninformed 
traders would be preserved, while significantly reducing the 
ability of HFTs to conduct their slow market arbitrage and 
dark pool activities.
 
HFTs and Volatility
Overall, there is little evidence that HFT activities increase 
market volatility on an ongoing basis. The connection 
between HFTs and episodic volatility is not attributable to 
predatory behavior by HFTs, but rather to their rational with-
drawal from the market at certain moments of stress. 
There are nonetheless a number of existing proposals that 
address the alleged link between HFT activity and volatil-
ity. These proposals fall into two groups: one seeks to limit 
trading volatility generally and would incidentally affect 
HFTs; the second seeks to target a specific link between HFTs 
and volatility. 
The first group includes SEC-governed single-stock 
circuit breakers, which impose a five-minute trading halt if 
the price of a specific stock moves by more than 10% within 
five minutes. This gives liquidity providers breathing room to 
consider whether order imbalances actually reflect informa-
tion. Similarly, the SEC has also approved a “limit up-limit 
down” plan that suspends trading in a stock if transactions 
move more than a certain amount, often 5%, away from the 
security’s average price over the last five minutes. These are 
both moderate proposals that should help limit future crashes.
The second set of proposals assumes that market makers 
should have stronger liquidity-providing obligations than 
they currently do. In the wake of the Flash Crash, exchanges 
have already imposed a range of affirmative obligations on 
institutionally identified market makers at their venues. 
For instance, the NYSE has “designated market makers” 
who have specific obligations to help maintain an orderly 
and continuous trading market in particular stocks. Some 
commentators want HFTs to have legal responsibilities resem-
bling those of the pre-2005 NYSE specialists.
We understand the desire for liquid markets even during 
periods of extreme volatility. But any system that requires 
liquidity providers to take heavy losses during periods of 
extreme adverse selection must compensate them for doing 
the costs of such a regulation in terms of liquidity could be 
substantial. It sets a floor on the length of the option offered 
by liquidity providers to liquidity takers, which increases 
their chance of being “picked off” by informed traders and 
so would tend to widen spreads as liquidity providers increase 
the cost of liquidity in response.
Another much-discussed proposal calls for replacing the 
current market trading structure that features continuous 
two-sided (i.e. buy and sell) auctions for each security with 
frequent batch auctions, say, every 100 milliseconds.51 Batch 
auctions would consist of uniform-price, sealed-bid auctions 
conducted at discrete time intervals. But if frequent batch 
auctions have the potential to eliminate the value of minute 
speed advantages, their effectiveness in so doing would 
depend on how they are implemented. To eliminate such 
advantages, every exchange would have to hold its auction 
simultaneously. If auctions were sufficiently frequent and 
held at different times at each exchange, then intra-exchange 
exploitation of tiny speed differences could persist, includ-
ing electronic front-running. We consider this an intriguing 
proposal, but it would be difficult to implement on a system-
wide basis. 
We think there is an approach to ending HFT information 
speed advantages that is simpler both in terms of implementa-
tion and of achieving the needed legal changes. None of these 
three practices would be possible if private data feeds did not 
make top-of-the-book quote and transaction data effectively 
available to some market participants before others. Thus, 
one potential regulatory response to the problem posed by 
HFT activity is to require that private dissemination of quote 
and trade information be delayed until the exclusive proces-
sor under the Reg. NMS scheme, referred to as the “SIP,” has 
publicly disseminated information from all exchanges. 
Rule 603(a) of Reg. NMS already prohibits exchanges 
from “unreasonably discriminatory” distribution of market 
data.52 The SEC has interpreted this to mean that privately 
“distributed data could not be made available on a more 
timely basis [to private clients] than core data is made 
available to a Network processor [the SIP]… Rule 603(a) 
prohibits an SRO or broker-dealer from transmitting data 
to a vendor or user any sooner than it transmits the data to a 
Network processor.”53 This interpretation of the “unreason-
ably discriminatory” distribution language appears to permit 
core data information to reach HFTs more rapidly than the 
public recipients of the SIP as long as the signal to the HFT 
and the signal from the SIP went out at the same time. And 
the SEC, in its choice of enforcement actions, has confirmed 
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55. See Angel et al., supra note 15, at 33.
56. Economist James Angel, among others, has called for greater disclosure by bro-
kers, suggesting that “brokerage firms themselves disclose execution quality directly to 
their customers.” Testimony of James J. Angel, The Role of Regulation in Shaping Eq-
uity Market Structure and Electronic Trading: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Bank-
ing, Housing, and Urban Affairs at 7 (2014).
57. Brokers do have limited disclosure requirements under Reg. NMS. Rule 605 re-
quires trading venues to provide monthly reports with various measures of execution 
quality, and Rule 606 requires broker-dealers that route customer orders to provide 
quarterly reports that identify at an aggregate level the venues where client orders are 
executed. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.605-606.
that the issues raised by such practices can fundamentally 
be understood through just two basic mechanisms—adverse 
selection and the principal-agent problem—as they play out 
in the context of a multi-venue trading system.
We briefly assess the likely effectiveness of a variety of 
potential reforms to current market structure. We agree, for 
example, that brokers should be required to disclose more 
information about their effectiveness in carrying out the 
orders of their customers, particularly those directed to dark 
pools. We disagree with proposals that HFTs be required 
to keep their quotes in force for some minimum amount of 
time, and with proposals aimed at generally discouraging, 
or even banning, trading on dark pools. These are bad ideas 
that seem to be based on a misunderstanding of how the 
market really works or of the actual social impact of a given 
practice. In other cases that involve complicated trade-offs, 
it may not be obvious whether a reform is desirable, but our 
framework allows for a better understanding of the tradeoff 
involved, and thus a more informed choice—and it may 
have the added benefit of pointing to where further empiri-
cal research would be useful. We find this to be the case with 
proposals to briefly delay providing HFTs with information 
about new transactions and quotation changes, so that HFTs 
have no advantages over other traders. 
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so at other times. Determining the value of that compen-
sation is extremely difficult, and these designated liquidity 
providers will be the prime targets of informed traders during 
crises.55 Thus, we are skeptical about such proposals, especially 
because the wealth transfers and efficiency consequences of 
episodic volatility are not as substantial as many critics seem 
to believe.
Dark Pools
Our analysis suggests that the regulatory focus here should 
be on ensuring disclosure of whether customer orders are 
being routed to the venues offering best execution and 
whether order routing directions are being ignored. FINRA 
has recently requested comment on several new proposed 
rules promoting greater disclosure. Dark pools should provide 
FINRA with more extensive order book information for the 
Order Audit Trail System (“OATS”) that helps FINRA carry 
out its surveillance activities. Brokers could be required to 
disclose what percentage of orders routed to their venue were 
executed there, at what price, and what instructions, if any, 
were associated with those orders.56 
Certainly, more could be done to strengthen the stock 
market’s mandatory disclosure regime. Brokers are not 
currently required to disclose to customers on their trans-
action confirmation slips the venue in which an order was 
executed,57 even though such records must already be retained 
and would provide customers with the ability to check 
whether their requests were being followed. To be effective, 
these disclosure proposals would have to enable the SEC or 
private litigants to reveal inaccurate broker disclosures, and 
customers would need to examine and act on those disclo-
sures. If we have reason to worry that they will not, the SEC 
should conduct periodic audits to verify the accuracy of these 
confirmations.
Conclusion
This article provides a comprehensive framework for under-
standing a number of controversial players and practices in 
the new stock market, including high frequency traders, 
electronic front running, and dark pool operators. We argue 
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58. In the example, if Lightning did not engage in slow market arbitrage, it is possible 
that it would be another HFT engaging in slow market arbitrage, not an ordinary trader, 
who would transact against the $161.13 offer. The ultimate question we are asking, 
however, is what would happen if no HFT engaged in the practice.
it—consider who would have been better off if Lightning had 
posted a new buy limit order instead of seizing Lowprice’s 
$161.13 offer. The person or persons helped would come from 
one of two groups of potential liquidity takers.  One group is 
potential sellers who submit marketable sell orders: the posted 
bid that Lightning would need filled would improve the terms 
for the marginal seller. The other group is potential buyers who 
submit marketable buy orders: the opportunity by members of 
this group to seize Lowprice’s $161.13 offer, which was better 
than anything else available in the market at the time, would 
improve terms for the marginal buyer.
Section 2
Example of HFT Exploitation of Mid-Point Orders
1. An example. Let us bring back again our HFT, Lightning. 
Suppose that the NBO and NBB for IBM are $161.15 and 
$161.11, respectively, and each are for 1,000 shares and are 
posted on NYSE by HFTs other than Lightning. Then the 
$161.15 offer is cancelled and a new 1,000 share offer is submit-
ted at $161.12. Lightning, through its co-location facilities at 
NYSE, learns of these changes in advance of their being publicly 
reported. During the reporting gap, the official NBO remains 
$161.15.
Lightning knows that mid-point orders for IBM are often 
posted on Opaque, a well-known dark pool, and Lightning 
programs its algorithms accordingly. Because Opaque does not 
disclose what is in its limit order book, Lightning cannot know, 
however, whether at this moment any such orders are posted on 
Opaque, and, if there are, whether they are buy orders or sell 
orders. Still there is the potential for making money.
Using an ultra-fast connection between the co-location 
facility at NYSE and Opaque, a sell limit order for 1,000 shares 
at $161.13 is sent to Opaque with the condition attached that 
it cancel if it does not transact immediately (a so-called “IOC” 
order). This way, if there was one or more mid-point buy limit 
orders posted at Opaque for IBM, they will execute against 
Lightning’s order at $161.13, half way between the now stale, 
but still official, NBB of $161.11 and NBO of $161.15. If there 
are no such mid-point buy orders posted at Opaque, nothing 
is lost. 
Assume that there are one or more such mid-point buy 
orders aggregating to at least 1,000 shares and so Lightning’s 
sell order of 1,000 shares transacts at $161.13. Lightning’s 
co-location facility at NYSE is informed of this fact through 
Lightning’s ultra-fast connection with Opaque. A marketable 
buy order for 1000 shares is sent almost instantaneously to 
NYSE, which transacts against the new $161.12 offer.  Thus, 
within the short period before the new $161.12 offer on NYSE 
is publicly reported, Lightning has been able to execute against 
this offer, purchase 1,000 IBM shares at $161.12, and sell them 
at $161.13, for what appears to be a $10.00 profit.
APPENDIX
Section 1
Example of slow-market arbitrage
An example. 
It is worth noting that the first step in this story—Lowprice’s 
posting of the $161.13 offer on EDGE—does not guarantee 
that Lightning can make this profit. No marketable buy order 
may arrive at NYSE during the reporting gap. Also, even if 
one does, by the time Lightning is able to submit its market-
able buy order at EDGE, some other person may already have 
submitted a buy marketable order to EDGE that picks off the 
$161.13 offer.  This becomes particularly likely if, as is the case 
in the real world, there are a number of HFTs besides Lightning 
with co-location facilities at EDGE and at the other exchanges. 
Depending on the nature of their own respective offers posted 
on various exchanges, one or more of these other HFTs may be 
competing with Lightning to pick off the one $161.13 offer. 
Who is helped and who is hurt in the example above, 
and what are the larger distributive consequences with slow 
market arbitrage as an ongoing practice? 58 In the example, 
the first thing to note is that Ms. Stumble, the person who, 
during the reporting gap, submits the marketable order that 
transacts against Lightning’s stale $161.15 offer, is not harmed 
by Lightning’s slow market arbitrage activities. Stumble would 
have suffered the same fate if Lightning had not engaged in slow 
market arbitrage because that course of action would have also 
left the $161.15 offer posted on NYSE, and so Stumble’s buy 
order would still have transacted against it.
Still, someone must be worse off: Lightning is better off 
than if it had not engaged in the slow market arbitrage, and 
trading is a zero-sum game. To see who this worse off person 
may be, consider first why Lightning is better off. Lightning is 
in the business of buying and selling shares, not holding on to 
long or short positions for any significant period of time. So it 
needs to reverse quickly each transaction it enters. Here, it sold 
shares when Stumble’s order transacted against Lightning’s 
$161.15 offer on NYSE. To reverse this transaction, Lightning 
needed to buy shares. By engaging in slow market arbitrage, 
it did so by seizing the best offer in the market—Lowprice’s 
$161.13 offer on EDGE—before others in the market even 
knew the offer was available. If Lightning had not detected 
this new offer ahead of others and seized it, Lightning’s rever-
sal of the situation would occur through posting a bid that 
a marketable order transacts against. We know from Part III 
that the sale of the shares at $161.15 and their repurchase at 
this newly posted bid would each, on an expected basis, be 
a break-even transaction. By successfully engaging in slow 
market arbitrage, Lightning instead made a certain $.02 profit 
per share sold and purchased. 
To figure out who is hurt from Lightning engaging in slow 
market arbitrage—i.e., detecting the $161.13 offer and seizing 
